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The metis of  
responsible innovation
Helping society to get better at the conversation  
between today and tomorrow
Esteemed Rector Magnificus, colleagues, family and friends
For most of my academic career I have been driven by the simple idea that the future 
could be otherwise (Irwin 2016). This is a shorthand for a complex set of arguments 
that seek to inject social agency into technological decision-making, the argument 
being that unless we find ways to shape science and innovation in tune with widely 
shared social values, future changes will occur without explicit societal shaping, 
commonly driven by the power of incumbent interests and the delegation of ‘the 
good’ to market forces. Thus, over the years, I have become engaged with a variety of 
technological domain areas – focusing predominantly on what my friend Richard 
Owen calls ‘techno-visionary’ science and innovation – exploring ways to understand 
the social and ethical issues associated with emerging science and technology at an 
upstream stage, and to develop novel frameworks of governance that can 
accommodate them. In pursuit of the latter I have become implicated in the 
development of frameworks of responsible innovation. In this inaugural lecture, 
using the ancient Greek idea of metis, defined as the practical skills and acquired 
knowledge required to respond to a constantly changing environment, I speak to the 
craft of doing responsible innovation, how it was put to use in devising a framework 
for the UK research councils and how in the context of particular technological 
innovations – using nanotechnology, climate geoengineering and agricultural 
biotechnology as cases – academic and policy understandings have to some extent 
been reconfigured and new directions opened up. I conclude with reflections on 
Wageningen as a site for collaboration on the crafting of responsible futures.
4 | Prof.dr Philip Macnaghten   The metis of responsible innovation
Introduction
Responsibility as a concept refers to the historical and largely ‘modern’ idea of people 
as possessing capacities for reflective action as moral agents. To act responsibly 
implies that to some extent we are answerable for our actions. This infers a capacity 
both to reflect upon our actions and to act upon our reflections, which implies a 
degree of free will or human agency (Hage and Eckersley 2012). One can act in a 
responsible manner either because we are acting on what we have done or failed to do 
in relation to the effects of our actions – what corresponds to a ‘retrospective’ or 
consequentialist framing of responsibility commonly associated with notions of 
accountability or liability – or where one can act with a view to the kinds of futures we 
collectively aspire towards – a future-oriented view of responsibility commonly 
characterized by notions of care and responsiveness (Pellizzoni 2004). 
The governance and oversight of science has until recently been associated with a 
particular notion of responsibility. Since policy actors and scientists alike have 
invoked the project of science as emancipatory, the role responsibilities of scientists 
have been internally configured as that of producing reliable knowledge, typically 
through conforming to the so-called Mertonian norms. The beneficial impacts of 
science on society would be guaranteed, the argument went, through the institutional 
ordering of modern science according to the imperatives of communalism, 
universalism, disinterestedness and organized scepticism (the CUDOS principles). 
However, from the mid-20th century onwards, as the power of science and technology 
to produce both benefit and harm has become clearer – ranging from the agonising of 
physicists over their responsibilities towards the bomb (Weart 1976) to the increasing 
potential for novel technologies to generate unforeseen and potentially irreversible 
consequences (Beck 1992) – it has become apparent that debates concerning 
responsibility in science need to be broadened to extend both to their collective and 
to their external impacts (foreseen and unforeseen) on society. 
Responsibility in science governance has historically been concerned with the 
‘products’ of science and innovation, particularly impacts that are later found to be 
unacceptable or harmful to society or the environment. Recognition of the limitations 
of governance by market choice has led to the progressive introduction of post hoc, 
and often risk-based regulation, such as in the regulation of chemicals, nuclear power 
and genetically modified organisms. This has created a well-established division of 
labour where science-based regulation, framed as accountability or liability, 
determines the limits or boundaries of innovation, and where the articulation of 
socially desirable objectives – or what Rene von Schomberg describes as the ‘right 
impacts’ of science and innovation – is delegated to the market (von Schomberg 2013). 
For example, with genetically modified foods, the regulatory framework is concerned 
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with an assessment of potential risks to human health and the environment rather that 
with whether this is the model of agriculture we collectively desire.
This consequentialist framing of responsibility is limited, because the past and 
present do not provide a reasonable guide to the future and because such a 
framework has little to offer to the social shaping of science towards socially desired 
futures (Adam and Groves 2011; Grinbaum and Groves 2013). With innovation, we 
face a dilemma of control (Collingridge 1980), in that we lack the evidence on which 
to govern technologies before pathologies of path dependency, technological lock-in, 
‘entrenchment’ and closure set in. Dissatisfaction with a governance framework 
dependent on risk-based regulation and with the market as the core mediator has 
moved attention away from accountability, liability and evidence towards more 
future-oriented dimensions of responsibility – encapsulated by concepts of care and 
responsiveness – that offer greater potential for reflection on uncertainties, purposes 
and values that underpin scientific innovation and thus for the co-creation of 
responsible futures. 
Such a move is deeply challenging for at least three reasons: first, because there exists 
few rules or guidelines to define how science and technology should be governed in 
relation to forward-looking and socially desirable objectives (see Hajer 2003, on the 
concept of the institutional void); second, because the (positive and negative) 
implications of science and technology are commonly a product of complex and 
coupled systems of innovation that rarely can be attributed to the characteristics of 
individual scientists (see Beck 1992, on the concept of ‘organised irresponsibility’); 
and third, because of a still-pervasive division of labour in which scientists are held 
responsible for the integrity of scientific knowledge and in which society is held 
responsible for future impacts (Douglas 2003).
A framework of responsible innovation
it is this broad context that guided our attempt to develop a framework of 
responsible innovation for the UK research councils (see Owen et al. 2012; Stilgoe et 
al. 2013). In collaboration with my colleagues Richard Owen and Jack Stilgoe, and 
building on insights and an emerging literature largely drawn from Science and 
Technology Studies (STS), we started by offering a broad definition of responsible 
innovation, derived from the prospective notion of responsibility described above:
“Responsible innovation means taking care of the future through  
collective stewardship of science and innovation in the present.” 
(Stilgoe et al. 2013: 1570)
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Our framework originates from a set of questions that public groups typically ask of 
scientists, or would like to see scientists ask of themselves. Based on a meta-analysis 
of cross-cutting public concerns articulated in 17 UK government-funded public 
dialogues on science and technology undertaken in an earlier project, we identified 
five broad thematic concerns that structured public responses: these were concerns 
with the purposes of emerging technology, with the trustworthiness of those 
involved, with whether people feel a sense of inclusion and agency, with the speed 
and direction of innovation, and with equity: i.e. whether it would produce fair 
distribution of social benefit (Macnaghten and Chilvers 2014). This typology, which 
appears to be broadly reflective of public concerns across a decade or so of research 
and across diverse domains of emerging technology (amongst our own, see Grove-
White et al. 1997; Macnaghten 2004; Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013; Macnaghten 
et al. 2015; Williams et al. 2015), can be seen as a general approximation of the 
factors that mediate concern and that surface in fairly predictable ways when people 
discuss the social and ethical aspects of an emerging technology. If we take these 
questions to represent aspects of societal concern in research and innovation, 
responsible innovation can be seen as a way of embedding deliberation on these 
within the innovation process. From this typology we derived four dimensions of 
responsible innovation – anticipation, inclusion, reflexivity, and responsiveness (the 
AIRR framework) – that provide a framework for raising, discussing and 
responding to such questions. The dimensions are important characteristics of a 
more responsible vision of innovation, which can, we argue, be heuristically helpful 
for decision-making on how to shape science and technology in line with societal 
values. 
Anticipation is our first dimension. Anticipation prompts researchers and 
organisations to develop capacities to ask ‘what if. . .?’ questions , to consider 
contingency, what is known, what is likely, what are possible and plausible impacts. 
Inclusion is the second dimension, associated with the historical decline in the 
authority of expert, top-down policy-making and the deliberative inclusion of new 
voices in the governance of science and technology. Reflexivity is the third dimension 
defined, at the level of institutional practice, as holding a mirror up to one’s own 
activities, commitments and assumptions, being aware of the limits of knowledge 
and being mindful that a particular framing of an issue may not be universally held. 
Responsiveness is the fourth dimension, requiring science policy institutions to 
develop capacities to focus questioning on the three dimensions listed above and to 
change shape or direction in response to them. This demands openness and 
leadership within policy cultures of science and innovation such that social agency in 
technological decision-making is empowered.
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To summarise, our framework for responsible innovation starts with a prospective 
model of responsibility, works through four dimensions, and makes explicit the need 
to connect with cultures and practices of science and innovation. Since its inception 
our framework is being put to use by research funders and research organisations 
alike. Indeed, since we developed the framework in 2012, one of the UK research 
councils, the Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC) has made 
an explicit policy commitment to it (EPSRC 2013; Owen 2014). Starting in 2013, using 
the alternative ‘anticipate-reflect-engage-act’ (AREA) formulation (see Murphy et al. 
2016), EPSRC have developed policies that set out their commitments to develop and 
promote responsible innovation, and their expectations both for the researchers they 
fund and for their research organisations. 
In the next part of this lecture I focus on the practice of doing responsible innovation, 
using previous research projects on nanotechnology, climate geoengineering and 
agricultural biotechnology as cases. I argue that the successful accomplishment of 
responsible innovation requires practical craft skills alongside formal epistemic skills, 
which I refer to using the ancient Greek concept of metis, following Marcel Detienne 
and Jean-Pierre Vernant’s majestic treatment of the term in Cunning Intelligence in 
Greek Culture and Society (Detienne and Vernant 1978). According to Detienne and 
Vernant, metis was a permanent mental category in ancient and classical Greek 
thought that has been systematically marginalised by classical scholars due to the 
dominant legacy of the Platonic metaphysical tradition. Mythologically, Metis – the 
wise councillor – was Zeus’ first wife who Zeus ingested so to avoid the prophesy 
that Metis would give birth to powerful children who would eventually overpower 
him. Culturally, metis came to represent the combination of wisdom, deep thought 
and magical cunning; an informed prudence that involves close observation, 
flexibility and the ability to seize the moment; an ability to foresee the unforeseeable, 
to be present in the world of becoming and to dominate a situation by becoming 
“even more supple, even more shifting, more polymorphic than the flow of time” 
(Detienne and Vernant 1978: 20). It is this capacity that makes possible a reversal of 
power and that enables the poor and the weak to dominate the big and the powerful. 
In his classic book Seeing like a State, James Scott (1998) appeals to metis as the 
necessary antidote to the logos and ‘imperial’ rationalist knowledge taken to their 
logical extreme in high modernist authoritarian plans that attempt to impose 
administrative order on nature and society, and that believe that scientific 
intervention can improve every aspect of human life. Metis is the practical skills and 
acquired intelligence that enables Odysseus to outwit the Cyclops, the fox to outwit 
the crow, Mark Twain’s riverboat pilot to navigate the Mississippi. Metis is the skills 
that are needed to respond to “a constantly changing natural and human 
environment”, “to which no formula can apply”, and “which is most valuable in 
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settings that are mutable, indeterminant (some facts are unknown), and particular” 
(Scott 1998: 313–316).1
Responsible innovation requires the cultivation of practical skills – metis – given the 
indeterminacies of foreseeing the future impacts of early stage science and 
technology, of undertaking such work with and for society, and of using such 
understanding to reverse existing trajectories, commonly reinforced by the power of 
incumbent interests. Indeed, what codified knowledge that does exist – in the form of 
codes of practice, indicative techniques and approaches – will need critically to be 
translated, extended and at times reversed if they are to be locally successful. I now 
turn to the metis that was enacted in each of my three research cases, focusing on the 
practical skills and judgement that led to the reconfiguration of academic and policy 
understandings and to the opening up of new research directions.
Case 1: Nanotechnology and the crafting of ‘upstream’ public dialogue2
Nanotechnology is my first case and stems from research aimed at crafting an 
‘upstream’ public engagement methodology for emerging nanotechnologies. 
Following the political controversies associated with agricultural biotechnologies and 
their failure to command societal acceptance, the policy context for the research was 
to explore whether new deliberative mechanisms for interaction with the public 
could lead to better representation of the potential social and ethical implications of 
the technology, at a stage early enough to guide (or even restrict) their further 
development. Yet, is this possible? Are social science methodologies and conceptual 
approaches up to the task?
Crafting a methodology
Working with colleagues Sarah Davies and Matthew Kearnes, and building on earlier 
collaboration at Lancaster’s Centre for the Study of Environmental Change especially 
with Robin Grove-White and Brian Wynne, we responded to this challenge through 
crafting a methodology aimed at a contextual understanding of how people develop 
their attitudes under conditions of unfamiliarity. For the European-funded 
Deepening Ethical Participation and Engagement in Emerging Nanotechnologies 
(DEEPEN) research project we developed a three-part methodology: an initial focus 
group where participants discussed their views on technology and where different 
1 Unlike the concept – or what Aristotle calls the intellectual virtue – of phronesis, which similarly is 
associated with practical wisdom and experiential knowledge, metis cannot be understood in rational terms  
but must be approached by subtlety, indirection, even cunning.
2 Detailed accounts of our research on nanotechnology and narrative can be found in Davies et al. 2009; 
Davies and Macnaghten 2010; Macnaghten 2010; Macnaghten et al. 2010; Macnaghten et al. 2015.
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frames of nanotechnology were introduced, a reconvened focus group a few days 
later where people discussed what they considered to be the key issues at stake and 
where they worked on the presentation of these issues in the form of a sketch, and 
later that day a theatre session in which one focus group presented their sketch to 
another. 
The focus groups were designed to encourage discussion of potential issues arising 
for nanotechnology, where the analytical task was one of examining the cultural 
forms and processes through which the unfamiliar was rendered familiar. Narrative 
was a key concept in the research, defined for our purposes as a spoken or written 
account of connected events that depicts the world at a level of generality that is 
applicable across a range of contexts, and that operates as a resource that people 
draw upon in everyday social interaction and discourse. Our research questions 
included the following: What substantially concerns people about emerging 
nanotechnology? What factors underpin and mediate these concerns? What narrative 
resources do people draw upon to make novel innovation readily sensible and 
meaningful? How do these emerge and solidify in guided social interaction? How 
and at what level and with what epistemological and ontological significance can 
these be codified? Can these be considered in some manner or form ‘arche’ or master 
narratives (for a more detailed account of the research design principles and of the 
metis deployed, see Macnaghten et al. 2015)?
Listening to the focus group dialogues, we were struck by the dilemmatic qualities of 
public concerns and hopes. Rarely were people either ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ a particular 
technology. Nor, were people responding in simple distributional terms, of 
evaluating the apparent benefits of the technology pitted against its harms. Rather, 
the way people constructed their responses, in conversation, spoke to the moral 
meanings of the technology, its purposes, its transformative and transgressive 
potential. Strikingly, as the discussions progressed, we witnessed a ‘tragic’ mood to 
inflect the ways in which participants imagined the technology to fold into the future. 
Variously, nanotechnology innovation, driven by capital and neoliberal logics, was 
seen as likely to exacerbate, inter alia, individualism and conspicuous consumption, 
sloth and insularity, local and global inequalities, danger and at times catastrophe, 
and ultimately free-will and what it means to be human. Collectively, our 
participants appeared to reject the key modernist Enlightenment narrative of science 
that imagines technology to drive inexorably forward and to bring, with appropriate 
governance and steering, inevitable social benefits (Davies et al. 2009).
This is not to imply that our participants did not tell positive stories about science. 
They did. Our focus group discussions were replete with stories about the power of 
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scientific breakthrough, the virtues of scientific curiosity and the potential for science 
to ameliorate human ills. Nevertheless, people rarely expressed confidence that 
scientific innovation under real-world conditions and under current structures of 
regulation and oversight would overcome seen and unforeseen harms and ills3. 
Which begs the question: if people are not drawing on this standard modernist 
narrative of science, what counter-narratives are being drawn upon to structure 
public responses (Bamberg and Andrews 2004)? In exploring this question, the 
DEEPEN research identified five underpinning cultural narratives, each familiar in 
Western culture, which were continually enacted and re-performed in the focus 
group discussions (Macnaghten et al. 2015). The use of age-old narratives does not 
mean that these narratives are somehow static or that our participants can be 
represented somehow as representatives of the past. Rather, what we are saying is 
that past stories can be very useful in explaining an unfamiliar present and in 
developing a vocabulary for an imagined future, including why people feel 
impoverished agency in shaping technological choices and trajectories. I now 
describe each of these narratives in turn.
The five DEEPEN counter-narratives
The ‘be careful what you wish for’ narrative is the first of the DEEPEN narratives. As 
Dupuy recounts in his narratology of the five DEEPEN narratives, the idea that 
getting exactly what you wish for may lead to unforeseen disaster and catastrophe 
“is one of the most ancient wisdoms of the Western world and, probably, of 
humankind in general, as soon as it begins to reflect on the relationship between 
human desire and the human good” (Dupuy 2010: 155): a familiar and staple theme 
embedded in philosophy, folklore, literature (both adult and children), song, poetry 
and film. In our focus groups, participants were concerned by the ethically troubling 
nature of the seductive promises nanotechnology holds out. Nanotechnology-derived 
products and innovations may be desirable and even offer the promise of perfection, 
but there was a sense that getting exactly what you want may not ultimately be good 
for you. In the theatre sessions where participants developed theatre scripts to play 
out the issues associated with nanotechnologically-generated futures, each of the 
improvised plays presented by our focus group participants could be regarded as a 
modern-day morality tale, where nanotechnology came to represent a particular kind 
of seduction (e.g. of eternal youth, control over nature, cures for all illness, perfect 
bodies and other forms of ‘boundless desire’) and where the quest to realize these 
3 Interestingly this ‘tragic’ mood is not particular to nanotechnologies but is replicated in parallel research on 
agricultural biotechnologies (Grove-White et al. 1997; Macnaghten 2004; Macnaghten and Carro-Ripalda 
2015), fracking technologies (Williams et al. 2015) and solar radiation management geoengineering technologies 
(Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013).
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(false) pleasures and desires were seen to lead to unforeseen consequences and at 
times disaster. 
Pandora’s Box is the second of the DEEPEN narratives. The story of Pandora’s box is 
a familiar one: a temptingly closed box or jar that, when opened, releases the gamut 
of human evils. The story has its origins in ancient Greek mythology: Pandora, the 
first woman, was given a huge jar that she was instructed not to open. Out of sheer 
curiosity, Pandora opened the lid and all the evils, miseries, diseases and illnesses 
that mankind previously had been spared from flew out and infected the world. In 
the DEEPEN dialogues, in response to especially radical and utopian claims for 
nanotechnology, even though such innovations were not born of evil intent, people 
used this narrative to explain why such intervention was likely to release unforeseen 
perils.
A close variant was the ‘messing with nature’ narrative. The idea that emerging 
(nano)technology has the potential to ‘mess with nature’ relies on the ancient idea of 
nature as having sacred qualities that establishes norms or order to the human world 
that should not be transgressed. Again, this is an ancient Greek story, linked to the 
Greeks’ conception of the sacred: the Gods, proving to be jealous of men, sent after 
them the goddess of vengeance, Nemesis, who unleashed revenge upon those who 
succumbed to the vice of hubris: arrogance before the Gods. The ‘messing with 
nature’ narrative was used in focus group talk to help explain the potential pitfalls of 
a technoscientific endeavour that was seen as disruptive of natural orders and 
boundaries and that did not respect preordained limits or basic human values. With 
nanotechnology, the ‘messing with nature’ narrative was commonly deployed in 
response to the technology’s promissory ambitions to extend control over the human 
and natural world.
The ‘kept in the dark’ narrative is a different kind of story. It was deployed in 
contexts where people feel powerlessness in the face of an emerging technology and, 
in particular, where they feel they have been left unaware of the technology’s 
existence and potential. It speaks to the concept of alienation, in the modern sense of 
being disenfranchised from the research and development (R&D) innovation process. 
There exist two variants: either that emerging technology is being controlled by elite 
actors (governments, corporations and the media) and where lay people are 
intentionally being ‘kept in the dark’ or, alternatively, that emerging technology has 
its own internal dynamics and logics that influence society in ways that are largely 
beyond cultural or political influence. This broad narrative was used to underpin 
people’s sensed lack of agency to emerging nanotechnology. Participants felt 
dependent and thus compelled to trust ‘expert systems’ (governments, regulators, 
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scientists, corporate R&D and media reporting) responsible for the development and 
governance of nanotechnology but deeply powerless over their conduct. 
Our final narrative is the ‘rich get richer’. Again largely a modern story, in so far as it is 
premised on the ideal of social equality as a foundational element in modernity, it 
speaks to the potential of emerging technology to engender further injustice and 
inequality, both globally and locally. Ultimately, the narrative goes, promises of 
environmental or inclusive technology will meet the inevitable logics of neoliberal 
political economy, resulting only in the rich—big business and the already powerful—
benefitting, while the poor or excluded are further marginalized. At a global level, this 
draws together concerns about a wealthy, consumer product-focused North enjoying 
both emerging technology and its benefits, while the global South is left behind; on a 
more local level, it is linked to concerns about the practicalities of ordinary people 
securing access to advances or consumer goods enabled by emerging technology. 
Reflections on progress, policymaking and post-Enlightenment social imaginaries
So far we have explored the stories that people draw upon in responding to emerging 
nanotechnology. Although there were other narrative resources available for people 
to draw upon, the five narratives highlighted above have emerged repeatedly and 
consistently in public dialogues not simply on nanotechnology but also across a 
diversity of technological arenas – from fracking (Williams et al. 2015) to agricultural 
biotechnologies (Grove-White et al. 1997; Macnaghten 2004), synthetic biology 
(TNS-BMRB 2010) to climate engineering (Corner et al. 2013; Macnaghten and 
Szerszynski 2013) – suggesting they are a reasonably robust means of understanding 
how public attitudes to emerging technology are formed in guided social interaction.
The obvious question is why these particular narratives seem to be so central to the 
articulation of public responses. Why these stories, and not others and why now? 
Partially this can be explained by their absence from formal processes of 
technological appraisal, which continually limits public involvement in societal 
agenda setting to the role of the consumer. These narratives are called forth, in other 
words, by neoliberal policy logics that emphasize inevitable technological progress 
and associated social gains, with little public space for questioning the purposes, 
nature and reality of either the progress or the social effects. It is this that brings forth 
a set of counter-narratives which highlight the precariousness of positive social 
impacts from rapid technological change, and which almost inevitably end in 
reinforcing the tragic (inequality in ‘the rich get richer’; or ecological or social disaster 
in ‘opening Pandora’s box’ or ‘messing with nature’).
For Dupuy (2010), the five DEEPEN narratives are not independent of each other but 
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should be grouped together into two metanarratives: one ancient, the other modern. 
The ancient metanarrative draws together the ‘be careful what you wish for’, 
‘Pandora’s Box’ and ‘messing with nature’ narratives. It is ancient because it explains 
the potential of ills and harms as the product of the transgression of norms and 
orders that hold a sacred or ontological quality, and where the standards of good and 
bad conduct transcend human affairs. By contrast, the ‘kept in the dark’ and the ‘rich 
get richer’ narratives are modern in that the fruits of science and technology are not 
put under scrutiny: it is simply that people are being excluded from decision-making 
processes (‘kept in the dark’) or that the benefits are unfairly distributed (‘rich get 
richer’). Thus, we could suggest that the formation of public attitudes to emerging 
technology depends on the interplay of three master narratives: a dominant master 
narrative of scientific breakthroughs linked to social progress and the triumph of 
pure knowledge ultimately derived from the Enlightenment (Lyotard 1984); an 
ancient counter-narrative where the transgression of natural orders and boundaries 
(hubris) lead to ills and harms (nemesis); and a modern counter-narrative where 
publics are exploited and alienated through technology. Our analysis of the ‘tragic’ 
quality of public narratives points to a collective rejection of this master narrative of 
science in guaranteeing social progress, and a failure of imagination of tractable 
alternatives in navigating science and technology in more environmentally and 
socially beneficial directions.
So, how did the story end? In the European context our research findings has 
contributed to a greater emphasis on the value of public deliberation in the 
governance of new technologies, to an articulation of public concerns and hopes as 
being situated in the long durée of historical thought, to the institutional challenges 
of engaging with enduring public narratives and, possibly, to an informed prudence 
that may have mitigated some of the excesses associated with early utopian visions 
of nanotechnology’s promise (for one such example, see Roco and Bainbridge 2003). 
Whether this narrative archaeological approach will extend to other cultures and 
technologies will depend, in large extent, on the collaborative intent of my friends 
and colleagues here at Wageningen.
Case 2: Good governance for geoengineering4
In this section I reflect on two encounters where craft knowledge and a degree of 
creative adaptability was required to help guide the responsible innovation of 
geoengineering research: first, to steer the discussion on whether and under what 
conditions, if any, field trials on solar radiation management (SRM) should proceed; 
4 Detailed accounts of our research on geoengineering, public engagement and governance can be found in 
Macnaghten and Owen 2011; Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013; Stilgoe et al. 2013; Szerszynski et al. 2013.
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the second, to articulate the nature and quality of public perceptions of 
geoengineering technologies through a reconfigured role for the social sciences. 
The SPICE project
While Richard Owen, Jack Stilgoe and I were working with the UK research councils 
to develop the responsible innovation framework described earlier, we were 
presented with an opportunity to work alongside a particular science and 
engineering project to explore how the framework could be developed and refined 
through practice. The case was the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate 
Engineering (SPICE) project, devised to investigate whether the purposeful injection 
of large quantities of sub-micron particles into the stratosphere could mimic the 
cooling effects of volcanic eruptions as a possible means to mitigate global warming 
(SPICE 2010). The SPICE project was set up to answer three broad questions: first, 
what quantity of which type(s) of particle would need to be injected into the 
atmosphere (and where), to effectively manage the climate system? Second, how 
might we deliver it there? Third, what are the likely impacts associated with 
deployment? In response to the second question, a test was proposed of a scaled 
down delivery system, a 1-km high hose attached to a tethered balloon. Although the 
testbed would not be a geoengineering test per se – the trial would spray only a small 
amount of water – the testbed nevertheless constituted the UK’s first field trial of a 
technology with geoengineering potential (Macnaghten and Owen 2011), and was as 
such deeply symbolic, even though this symbolism was not initially apparent to 
many of those involved. 
Following the publication of the Royal Society’s landmark geoengineering report in 
July 2009 (Royal Society 2009), the UK Research Councils convened a scoping 
workshop in October 2009 aimed at informing a programme of geoengineering 
research. The SPICE project was one of two projects funded from this workshop and 
did not include ethics or social science competency. Aware of at least some of the 
wider ethical and socio-political dimensions of solar radiation management, the UK 
research councils were sensitive to the potential for the SPICE project to be the 
subject of external scrutiny, particularly given that its proposed testbed moved 
beyond laboratory tests or simulations and thus could be defined as a “small field 
trial” (see SRMGI 2011, p. 26). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the SPICE project passed 
through the ethics procedures at the Universities concerned with little or no 
comment: the research did not involve human volunteers or animals and the research 
was unlikely to have a direct effect on the environment. Ethical codes for research 
tend to be based on a retrospective framing of responsibility (e.g. avoidance of harm 
and respect for human and animal rights) with little guidance on how research may 
be perceived as a symbolic act, a potential signifier of intent (in this case, the intent of 
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using geoengineering as a plausible response to the problem of climate change). 
Nevertheless, given the evident sensitivities involved, the research councils decided 
upon an oversight review process, to help determine whether the proposed testbed 
should proceed. 
It was at this stage that I became involved. As a member of the UK’s Engineering and 
Physical Science Research Council’s (EPSRC) Societal Issues Panel (SIP) my role was 
to provide advice and guidance to the executive on up-and-coming issues that had 
societal import. The terms of reference for the panel were loose: we were a small 
group of approximately eight members—made up of science and technology 
scholars, ethicists, governance specialists, journalists alongside societally-oriented 
physicists and engineers—that met three to four times a year to deliberate on matters 
on societal importance, with minimal formal responsibilities but with the ear of the 
executive. In many respects we were appointed for our skills in metis, our practical 
experience in both understanding and responding to societal issues and on crafting 
expert advice.
Following a presentation on the SPICE project in mid-2010, members of SIP voiced 
the opinion that the project posed a significant issue and responsibility for the 
Council and that they should proceed with caution. I was particularly vocal and 
subsequently was asked by the panel chair, Lord Robert Winston, if I would chair the 
oversight panel which was being set up to provide guidance on whether the 
proposed SPICE testbed should proceed as planned. At the same time my colleague 
Richard Owen and I were leading our project on responsible innovation for the 
research councils and we agreed to use our (at the time emerging) framework to help 
both the SPICE researchers and the research councils to characterise better the depth 
of the issues they were dealing with. More prosaically, Richard Owen became the 
architect — instigating a ‘stage gate’ review (a governance process in which funding 
for each phase of research and development is preceded by a decision point) and a 
set of criteria against which the SPICE team were asked to respond — while I ran the 
oversight review panel (Macnaghten and Owen 2011). Other members of the stage 
gate panel included a social scientist, a representative of a civil society organisation, 
an atmospheric scientist and an aerospace engineer.
The criteria and their implementation are described elsewhere (Owen 2014; Stilgoe et 
al. 2013) but are briefly summarised as follows. Criteria 1 and 2 involved 
consideration of direct risks, safety and regulatory compliance (e.g. for flying 
tethered balloons) associated with the testbed itself, for which the SPICE team were 
asked to submit a risk register and statement of regulatory compliance. The third 
criterion required the SPICE team to reflect on the project’s framing and 
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communication, asking them to develop a communication plan to allow 
dissemination about the nature and purpose of the testbed, and for this plan to be 
informed by dialogue with stakeholders. Criterion 4 asked the SPICE team to 
anticipate, reflect on and describe the envisaged applications of their research and 
the impacts (intended or otherwise) these applications may have, and to embed 
mechanisms to review these as more information became available in the future. It 
asked them to broaden their visions of application and impact, to think through other 
pathways to other impacts, to contextualise their work within a review of the known 
or potential risks and uncertainties of SRM and the questions (social, political, 
ethical) that might arise as the testbed is projected through to deployment. The final 
criterion asked the SPICE team to identify mechanisms to understand public and 
stakeholder views around the project and its envisaged applications and potential 
impacts, and the understandings, assumptions, uncertainties, framings and 
commitments associated with these. These criteria thus aligned to the framework for 
responsible innovation I have discussed earlier, asking the SPICE researchers to be 
anticipative, reflexive, inclusively deliberative and (ultimately) responsive.
Having defined the criteria around a framework of responsible innovation and agreed 
how the SPICE team, working with others, needed to respond, the oversight stage gate 
panel convened in June 2011 to undertake the evaluation. The panel was charged with 
providing a recommendation for each of the five criteria (pass, pass pending further 
information, fail) to the research councils who would make the final decision 
concerning the future of the testbed (Macnaghten and Owen 2011).  The panel decided, 
after considerable discussion, rebuttal and debate, that the first two criteria, concerning 
safety, risks and regulatory compliance associated with the testbed itself, were 
convincingly passed, but that the other three criteria would only be passed pending 
further work and provision of further information. There were particular concerns 
regarding the quality of the communications strategy and the extent to which it had 
been informed by stakeholder engagement and substantive pubic dialogue, the quality 
of the SPICE team’s reflective capacity on the testbed and whether they had sufficiently 
anticipated the future issues for SRM as it moved from the testbed projected through to 
deployment and, finally, the lack of substantive engagement with stakeholders 
concerning the project and its intended application(s). This was a challenging 
experience for all concerned that raised questions about the way the project had been 
set up largely as one investigating technical feasibility and environmental impacts, but 
not the wider social, ethical and political dimensions.  Amongst these was the question 
of whether the project should have been funded at all. 
On September 26th 2011, following a meeting with myself, Richard Owen and 
members of the SPICE team, the research councils decided to postpone the testbed 
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until the pending actions had been addressed, with the intention of convening the 
stage gate panel again to review this six months later. On that very same day the 
research councils received a letter, copied to the then UK Secretary of State for 
Energy and Climate Change and signed by more than 50 NGOs, demanding that the 
project be cancelled. The NGOs saw the testbed as symbolic, sending the wrong 
signal to the international community, deflecting political and scientific attention 
from the need to curb greenhouse gas emissions (HOME 2011).  There was concern 
that its “sole purpose is to engineer the hardware that would later allow chemicals to 
be injected into the stratosphere to reflect sunlight” as “a dangerous distraction from 
the real need: immediate and deep emissions cuts” that would “condemn future 
generations to continue a high-risk, planetary-scale technological intervention that is 
also likely to increase the risk of climate-related international conflict”.
With mounting interest in the media and beyond the SPICE team began to address 
the outstanding criteria. It was as part of the subsequent discussions that the projects’ 
principal investigator became aware of the existence of a patent application for the 
balloon-tethered hose delivery system (Davidson et al. 2011), submitted by one of the 
sandpit mentors just prior to the sandpit itself and including two of the SPICE project 
scientists as named inventors. Although an internal review conducted later by EPSRC 
found no evidence that research council policies on conflicts of interest had been 
broken, it was clear that the patent posed a significant issue for the project in terms of 
the nature of at least some of the participants’ motivations, as well demonstrating a 
lack of disclosure. In May 2012, following a series of further discussions, the principal 
investigator of the SPICE team decided to cancel the testbed, instigating a more 
formal process of stakeholder engagement (Stilgoe 2015).
The role of the social sciences in public engagement research
By late 2011 (a couple of months subsequent to the initial decision to postpone the 
SPICE testbed but prior to the eventual cancelation) my colleague Bronislaw 
Szerszynski and I were becoming concerned with how the social sciences were being 
enrolled in public engagement research on geoengineering. In particular, we 
questioned the framings that underpinned the dialogue designs and whether the 
methodologies were sufficiently flexible to capture the full range of social dynamics 
likely to be associated with the deployment of the technology. To respond to this gap 
we requested independent funding (unrelated to my EPSRC role and involvement) 
directly from Durham University (where I was then employed), and within a period of 
six weeks were embarking on a deliberative focus group public engagement project, 
guided by the principles of ‘upstream’ public engagement (see Macnaghten et al. 2015). 
Seven focus groups were carried out in three UK cities (Durham, Newcastle and 
London) in December 2011, each with six to eight participants and lasting three hours.  
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Perhaps not surprisingly, notwithstanding the complexity of the topic, across all the 
groups, participants were able to learn about the issues, to consider and reflect on 
them, to become engaged, hear different perspectives, change their minds and 
develop their points of view. The early stages of deliberation were characterised by 
a complexity of positions. For some, geoengineering should be opposed completely; 
for others, it was an option to be explored. However, as the discussions progressed 
and as they were exposed to multiple frames—geoengineering as a policy response 
to anthropogenic climate change (the dominant policy discourse), geoengineering as 
a retrospective technofix (the NGO discourse), geoengineering set within the 
geopolitical history of weather and climate modification—people developed a 
clearer sense of their views and attitudes. In line with current research findings there 
was general concern about the uncertainties involved, about unintended effects and 
about the ‘unnaturalness’ particularly of solar radiation management techniques 
(such as what was being proposed in the SPICE research) and of whether the 
technology constituted a short-term fix rather than a genuine solution to climate 
change. In addition to these findings, our research highlighted the conditionality of 
people’s responses since even for those who were initially supportive in principle of 
the technology, such support was at best reluctant and then, if only certain 
conditions were made. 
The five conditions were: confidence in climate science as a reliable guide to policy 
and action; confidence in the ability of research to anticipate the side effects of solar 
radiation management; confidence in the ability of research to demonstrate the 
efficacy of solar radiation management; confidence in the political organisation and 
effective governance of solar radiation management; and confidence in the capacity 
of existing political systems to accommodate solar radiation management. Having 
articulated the key conditions, we then explored how realistic, tenable, feasible, 
likely, probable, believable the conditions were perceived to be under real world 
conditions. Importantly, these conditions were seen by and large as highly 
implausible in terms of their potential to be met. Even those participants who 
started from a position of conditional acceptance grew to perceive the conditions for 
successful and acceptable deployment as being unfeasible and implausible i.e. the 
more people learned about SRM technology the more sceptical they became. 
So how did the story end? The SPICE testbed was postponed and later cancelled. The 
responsible innovation framework had provided a decision support tool that 
arguably helped the research councils avoid what was fast becoming a major science 
policy incident. The research councils learnt that in potentially controversial research 
there is an imperative for embedded social science and ethics competence and that 
there are occasions when social science research needs to prefigure technical and 
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engineering research. The public engagement research introduced a perspective that 
focused on the conditionality of public acceptance and the plausibility of these 
conditions being realised in practice; and, perhaps most profoundly, the research 
introduced the question as to whether SRM is a governable object, at least within 
democratic political systems. 
Case 3: Global lessons from GM crops5
My third and final case concerns the governance of agricultural biotechnology. It 
begins will a call issued in 2011 by the John Templeton Foundation, a US 
philanthropist trust dedicated to asking the ‘big questions’, in this case asking for 
innovative responses to the question as to whether ‘GM crops can feed the world’. 
This is a timely question. With world population expected to exceed 9 billion by 2050, 
with hunger and chronic malnutrition still afflicting over 800 million people, with a 
growing demand for food globally including meat and dairy products, with the need 
to protect land for biodiversity and ecosystem services, and with the mounting 
threats associated with climate change and the likely increased scarcity of water and 
land, it is unsurprising that developments in the life sciences are being called upon to 
respond to this global challenge.
At Durham University where I was then working, I led a broad-based interdisciplinary 
group that decided that the question that structured the call was not the most profitable 
way to structure a debate around agricultural sustainability. Our inversion ran as 
follows: “Unless we examine why GM crops have not been universally accepted as a 
public good, we will fail to understand the conditions under which GM crops can help 
to feed the world”. Our starting point thus began with local experience rather than 
with global imperative, with the dynamics of GM crops as understood and embedded 
in local practices rather than with a technology that requires optimal practices and 
policies to be successfully implemented. This attempt to reconfigure the debate was not 
merely academic. It was highly necessary given that agricultural GM crop technologies 
have been controversial not just in the UK and Europe but internationally.
Our second inversion was our choice of setting. The majority of scholarship on GM 
crops has focused on the Global North. Yet it will be in countries in the Global South 
more where agricultural innovation is most needed, where the bulk of food provision 
is expected to come from and where debates over GM technologies are likely to be 
5 Detailed accounts of our research on agricultural biotechnology and governance can be seen in Grove-White 
et al. 1997; and in various chapters in the edited collection, Macnaghten and Carro-Ripalda 2015: see in 
particular Carro-Ripalda et al. 2015; Egorava et al. 2015; Guivant and Macnaghten 2015; Macnaghten 2015a; 
Macnaghten 2015b.
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most intense. For this reason we choose to conduct detailed ethnographic qualitative 
work on farmers, scientists and publics, undertaken in collaboration with local 
partners—in Brazil on GM soya, in India on GM cotton and in Mexico on GM 
maize—engaging with the dynamics through which GM crops have been promoted, 
implemented and at times resisted across different scales and contexts by an 
inclusive array of actors.
Across the three case studies, we found that current approaches to the regulation and 
governance of GM crops have been dominated by risk-based assessment 
methodologies, the assumption being that the key criterion mediating their release 
should be an independent case-by-case risk assessment of their impacts on human 
health and the environment. One consequence of this framing is that the public 
debate surrounding GM crops has all too often been boiled down to one of safety: are 
they safe to eat, and are they safe to the environment? In relation to these questions 
we remain agnostic. Our argument was that we need, in addition, to ask different 
questions. If we are to govern GM crops in a socially and scientifically robust fashion, 
we need to engage with the issue within the terms of the debate as it is considered by 
an inclusive array of actors. 
In our research Suzanna Carro-Ripalda and her team found that maize in Mexico is 
highly culturally resonant, deeply engrained in Mexican identity and history as well 
as in everyday food practices (Carro-Ripalda and Astier 2014; Carro-Ripalda et al. 
2015). In such a context, protests against GM maize have come to signify the defence 
of Mexican culture in the face of an unwanted form of imposed neoliberal 
globalization. In Brazil, Julia Guivant and her team found that even though the 
coverage of GM crops had risen rapidly since 2005 (mostly GM soya and maize), the 
issue is far from settled, with little evidence of public acceptability or inclusive 
governance (Guivant and Macnaghten 2015). In India, Yulia Egorava and her team 
found that GM cotton has become a provocative symbol of foreign control and 
imposition, where regulatory bodies have been routinely criticized for using 
inadequate procedures for the approval of GM crops (Egorava et al. 2015). Overall, 
across each of the research sites we found that the factors responsible for the 
controversy over GM crops were social, cultural and institutional in nature, in each 
case transcending questions of technical risk (Macnaghten 2015a). Thus, not 
surprisingly, the technical regulatory bodies charged with approving the release of 
GMOs had not provided ‘authoritative governance’ (Hajer 2009): that is, they had not 
lead to decisions, developed through reasoned, open and transparent deliberation, 
that were seen as trustworthy and as worthy of acceptance by the broader 
community. 
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Responding to this ‘institutional void’ – namely, the lack of agreed structures or rules 
as to how technology should be governed in its ‘beyond risk’ dimensions – we 
examined whether frameworks of responsible innovation have traction in opening 
up new and more responsive governance options. Using the ‘anticipation-inclusion-
reflexivity-responsiveness’ (AIRR) responsible innovation framework we examined 
what responsible and inclusive governance could mean in practice: what new 
institutional capacities are required to anticipate better the wider driving forces as 
well as the impacts of agricultural technologies, how to open up an inclusive debate 
with stakeholders and wider publics, how to develop more reflexive scientific 
cultures and what kinds of new governance architectures are needed that are 
responsive to these processes (Macnaghten 2015b). This is a new application of the 
framework. While frameworks of responsible innovation have been developed and 
deployed in relation to novel and potentially transformative technologies, inquiry 
has yet to address whether they offer potential to open up governance arrangements 
on technologies that are already relatively mature, that already hold a certain degree 
of path dependency, and that have already proved to be socially and politically 
controversial. GM crops thus represent a ‘hard case’. If frameworks of responsible 
innovation are to prove successful in aligning innovation dynamics with societal 
values, they will have to demonstrate their capacities to shape existing technological 
trajectories, alongside those that remain ‘in-the-making’.
So how does the story end? It is too early to report a definitive policy impact. How 
this story unfolds, particularly in relation to the need for new governance 
arrangements in Europe for agricultural technologies, will depend not least on future 
collaboration across the Wageningen nexus – equipped par excellence to lead such 
innovations in governance.
Helping society to improve the conversation between today  
and tomorrow
So does the metis of responsible innovation offer new pathways to help society to 
improve the conversation between today and tomorrow. I believe it does. Whether 
– as in the nanotechnology – it is through the articulation not just of the 
reasonableness of public concerns but of how they are part of the grand durée of 
human thought, in this case stretching all the way back to the ancient Greeks; or – as 
in the geoengineering case – it is as a decision support tool that can help governing 
institutions make important decisions in the context of high complexity and 
uncertainty; or – as in the GMO case – it is in opening up governance discussions 
with the promise of innovations that are designed to become better embedded in 
society. In each case the aim is not simply to characterize societal values in all their 
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complexity but to feed such understanding back into scientific and governance 
processes. 
There is much more that needs to be done. How can we ensure that the lessons of 
previous technological failures – such as GMOs – are properly learnt? How can we 
ensure that scientists and innovators develop capacities to enable them to anticipate 
future impacts and embed societal values into their research? Or perhaps more 
ambitiously – as demonstrated in the nanotechnology case and its insights on the 
pervasiveness of ‘the tragic’ – how can we excavate a new set of cultural resources 
out of which to build a positive narrative of science?
Future directions at Wageningen
I am relatively new to Wageningen. But I feel extraordinarily happy and privileged to 
be here as I can think of no better place, and no better institution, to develop my 
research and to co-construct with all of you more responsible, more inclusive, more 
socially just futures. In education, I have taught a course on environmental 
communication and responsible innovation, where students develop an 
communication strategy which they have to test through a focus group project, thus 
learning the metis of how to embed innovation in society. Next year, my colleague 
Sietze Vellema and I develop a new masters’ level course in which we teach methods 
aimed at enabling innovation to become responsive to the needs of social actors. 
More long term, I plan to develop a minors in responsible innovation, with broad 
Communication, Philosophy and Technology (CPT) section-wide collaboration. 
Across the institution, my ambition is for responsible innovation to become a formal 
element of PhD training with additional bespoke courses for faculty. In all my vision 
is for Wageningen to become the go-to place in Europe to develop the craft skills for 
doing responsible innovation, particularly but not exclusively in life science 
applications.
There have also been already interesting developments in research. The Responsible 
Life-Sciences Innovations for Development in the Digital Age: Environmental Virtual 
Observatories for Connective Action (EVOCA) project, led out of CPT, has 
responsible innovation as a core underpinning conceptual framework. Indeed, a few 
weeks ago I had the privilege of running a 1 week course with the 11 EVOCA African 
PhD students, examining what responsible innovation could and should mean in 
relation to five cases: (1) a crop and disease management expert system in potato 
production in Ethiopia; (2) water monitoring and irrigation management for food 
production in Ghana; (3) a malaria mosquito radar as a digital citizen science 
platform in Rwanda; (4) tick-born disease and livestock-wildlife management in 
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Kenya; (5) sustainable intensification of cocoa and food crop farming systems in 
Ghana. The conversations were rich and insightful as the students reflected on how 
to embed their innovations in very particular and contingent societal contexts. To my 
knowledge this is the largest and most systematic attempt to apply responsible 
innovation in an international development context – a first for Wageningen.
I am also part of a new NWO investment, led by my colleague Vincent Blok and with 
Tom Long as research associate, which aims to explore the potential for integrating 
responsible innovation into sustainable entrepreneurship processes, with climate 
smart agriculture as a particular case. At the European level, I am part of a new 
Horizon 2020 consortium, leading the Wageningen team alongside Barbara van 
Mierlo and Vincent Blok, examining Wageningen University’s internal responsible 
innovation policies and practices alongside a workpackage addressing how to 
develop a global conversation on responsible innovation with Brazil as a particular 
case. While, more locally, I am coordinating the social science (SSG) contribution of 
the synthetic biology strategic theme investment, working with colleagues on the 
project of embedding social science (and ethics) into scientific research on synthetic 
biology, and of crafting approaches aimed at articulating the co-evolution of the 
technology and ethics.
What I want to finish with goes back to the theme of metis and the imperative of 
helping society to get better at the conversation between today and tomorrow. The 
future is a troubling category not least because we live in turbulent times. With rising 
and apparently intractable problems of war, migration and assorted nationalisms; 
with the rising peril of climate change; with the growing disconnect between citizens 
and the political class currently leading to unpredictable outcomes; with mounting 
mistrust in the capacity (and motivations) of governing institutions to provide 
enduring solutions; and with a lack of belief in current political philosophies, 
including neoliberalism, and a lack of plausible alternatives; it is not surprising that 
people find if increasingly difficult to maintain a belief in a better future. Science is 
inevitably caught up in these trends. In a modest way this is the context in which 
responsible innovation – and with a judicious application of metis – offers a way of 
structuring a conversation between today and tomorrow.
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Some words of thanks
I would like to give profound thanks and gratitude to Cees Leeuwis for his powers of 
facilitation, his wise council and his friendship. It was Cees who effectively brought 
not just me but my family over and without whom none of this would be possible. I 
would like to thank Noelle Aarts for her part in this story, her hospitality, passion 
and introductions. I would like to thank my colleagues in the KTI group, but also in 
the Philosophy and Strategic Communication group: I have enjoyed my 
conversations with many of you. This is a rich Section – with a creative and inspiring 
dynamic fast emerging – and I look forward to fruitful collaboration in the coming 
years.
I would also like to thank those who were particularly formative at an earlier stage: 
Robin Grove-White for showing me the way; the late John Urry who taught me how 
to be an academic; Brian Wynne who has in effect been my mentor for well over two 
decades. But I would also like to thank more recent friends and collaborative 
partners. Good ideas have always emerged out of conversations and friendship and I 
have been extremely fortunate in having such inspiring friends and collaborators as 
Richard Owen, Jack Stilgoe, Tom McLeish, Matthew Kearnes, Sarah Davies, James 
Wilsdon, Jason Chilvers, Alan Irwin and Barbara Adam.
But my real thanks goes to my family, to my sisters and brother including Antony 
who has joined me today – but especially my wife Simone, to our daughters Melina 
and Sophia as well as to Caio – who have uprooted their life and come to a new 
country, a new culture, a new (and rather odd) language. I would like to thank all of 
you – including our new friends in Wageningen and beyond – for making us feel at 
home.
Finally, I would like to thank you all for participating in this inaugural lecture.
Ik heb gezegd
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'In this inaugural lecture, using the ancient Greek idea of metis, 
defined as the practical skills and acquired knowledge required to 
respond to a constantly changing environment, I speak to the 
craft of doing responsible innovation, how it was put to use in 
devising a framework for the UK research councils and how in the 
context of particular technological innovations – using 
nanotechnology, climate geoengineering and agricultural 
biotechnology as cases – academic and policy understandings 
have to some extent been reconfigured and new directions 
opened up.'
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